Expert decision-making can be directly assessed, if sport action is understood as 4 an expression of embedded and embodied cognition. Here, we discuss evidence for this 5 claim, starting with a critical review of research literature on the perceptual-cognitive 6 basis for expertise. In reviewing how performance and underlying processes are 7 conceived and captured in extant sport psychology, we evaluate arguments in favour of 8 a key role for actions in decision-making, situated in a performance environment. Key 9 assumptions of an ecological dynamics perspective are also presented, highlighting how 10 behaviours emerge from the continuous interactions in the performer-environment 11 system. Perception is of affordances; and action, as an expression of cognition, is the 12 realization of an affordance and emerges under constraints. We also discuss the role of 13 knowledge and consciousness in decision-making behaviour. Finally, we elaborate on 14 the specificities of investigating and understanding decision-making in sport from this 15 perspective. Specifically, decision-making concerns the choice of action modes when 16 perceiving an affordance during a course of action, as well as the selection of a 17 particular affordance, amongst many that exist in a landscape in a sport performance 18 environment. We conclude by pointing to some applications for the practice of sport 19 psychology and coaching and identifying avenues for future research. How expert athletes decide to do what they do is a topic that has interested 27 scientists for several decades (e.g., Beise & Peasley, 1937), and particularly sport 28 psychologists(e.g., Straub & Williams, 1984) . It has been argued that sport is a most 29 appropriate context for studying expert decision-making (Gilovitch, 1984, Gilovitch et al, 30 1985. According to Gobet (2016), sport is a domain of expertise, where expertise relies 31 on perception: "experts literally 'see' things differently compared to novices" and "these 32 differences in perception and knowledge affect problem solving and decision making" 33 (Gobet, 2016, p.7). 34 Predicated on these ideas, studies of decision-making in sport have intensively 35 tested athletes'perception and anticipation, attention, memory, and decision-making. 36
Introduction 26
How expert athletes decide to do what they do is a topic that has interested 27 scientists for several decades (e.g., Beise & Peasley, 1937) , and particularly sport 28
psychologists(e.g., Straub & Williams, 1984) . It has been argued that sport is a most 29 appropriate context for studying expert decision-making (Gilovitch, 1984 , Gilovitch et al, 30 1985 . According to Gobet (2016) , sport is a domain of expertise, where expertise relies 31 on perception: "experts literally 'see' things differently compared to novices" and "these 32 differences in perception and knowledge affect problem solving and decision making" 33 (Gobet, 2016, p.7). 34 8 we discuss ecological dynamics as an important action-based, non-representational 176 approach to cognition. From this perspective, cognition is the on-going, active 177 maintenance of a robust performer-environment system, achieved by closely 178 coordinated perception and action (Araújo et al., 2006; Stepp et al., 2011) . 179 180
Theoretical criticisms: The world is its best model 181
The representational approach to human performance considers 182 representations as containing meanings of symbols (i.e., perceptual encoding of stimuli 183 in the brain, motor programs decoding intentions from brain, through the nervous 184 system, to physical apparatus for coordinating actions, e.g., muscles, joints, limbs, 185 bones)(see Araújo, 2007 , Shaw, 2003 . Representations are assumed to 'stand for' 186 things in the world and things in the body. However, the mechanisms typically 187
proposed for associative memory, or generally, knowledge structures are epistemic 188 mediators. They provide contact with the world for an individual athlete. In sport, the majority of decision-making studies follow the assumption that 202 decision-making and perceptual judgements are predicated on internalised knowledge 203 structures operating as inference engines to deliberate on 'the' best decision, or the 204 decision that 'best fits' the task. In this process, the same assembly of stimuli is assumed 205 to be perceived and commonly represented in the mind of every observer of a situation. 206
These stimuli are viewed as always constraining similar decisions and actions (the 207 "correct" decisions made by experts, for example). Thus, it is believed that some people 208 decide well and other people decide poorly. The problem is that, in open, dynamic 209 systems there is no "best decision", since the most functional decision at any moment 210 may compromise future decisions (Araújo et al., 2006; Davids & Araújo, 2010) . During 211 the act of perceiving, the limbs, ears or eyes of a performer explores available 212 information in an environment. Complex, structured energy fields of ambient, patterned 213 energy (i.e., information), such as light reflected from objects, are an environmental 214 resource to be sought and exploited by individuals, whocontinuously modulate their 215 interactions with the world, i.e., exerting their agency (Withagen et al., 2017) . 216
Information is the basis for maintaining contact with the environment because it is 217 specific to its sources. Thus, various exploratory actions of perceptual systems are 218 required for perception to occur. For the ecological dynamics approach, meaning in 219 perception is not derived from any form of mental association, or labelling, but only 220 from information detected by an observer. Therefore, perceptual learning, for example 221 due to training and experience, is the process of becoming attuned, i.e., better able to 222 differentiate more and more kinds of information, increasing the range and economy of 223 the information detection process (Reed, 1993) . 224
These arguments suggest that an individual's regulation of behaviour can be 225 explained without the postulation of mental representations. Decisions are expressed 226 by actions (Beer, 2003) . Planning an action before acting (denoted as "strategical" in 227 sports science) can influence the course of decisions (e.g., where to explore), but 228 behaviour is always dependent on circumstances (action is not a mechanical outcome, 229 but it is "tactical", i.e. an intentional exploration for an efficient solution). In this respect, 230 decision-making is an emergent behaviour (Araújo et al., 2006) . As the individual moves 231 with respect to her/his surroundings, there are opportunities for action (affordances, 232
Gibson, 1979) that persist, arise, and disappear, even though the surroundings remain 233 the same. Changes of action can give rise to multiple variations in opportunities for 234 subsequent actions. To exemplify, in team games, two defenders may face an attacker 235 with the ball, but the gap between the defenders may vary momentarily, inviting 236 different actions of the attacker, depending on his/her capacities (e.g., speed of 237 movement), amongst other things. Perception of affordances (opportunities for action) 238 is the basis for performers controlling her/his behaviours prospectively, i.e., regulating 239 future behaviors (Gibson, 1979; Turvey, 1992 ). An important aspect of expert 240 performance involves acting in a manner that is consistent with ways that are socio-241 culturally endorsed (Barab & Plucker, 2002 , van Dijk & Rietveld, 2017 , such as those 242 valued in different sports. Experience in acting in a performance context attunes 243 performers to perceptual variables that reliably specify the state of the environment 244 relevant to performance in a specific task (Araújo & Davids, 2011) . In this way, athletes 245 can use the situation as its own best model, actively exploring and scanning it in detail 246 at specific locations according to particular needs in the moment. This idea was 247 elegantly described by Rodney Brooks, a prominent scientist in robotics as 'the world as 248 its best model' (Brooks, 1991 Moderating effects on decisions and actions were most obvious when participants were 276 required to move in highly controlled laboratory conditions, rather than when actually 277 performing sporting actions under in situ task constraints (Travassos et al., 2013) . of knowledge is to make others aware and to articulate shared knowledge (Reed, 1991) . 477
Thus, contradicting some unfortunate misinterpretations in sport psychology (e.g., 478
Ripoll (Shaw, 2003) . Importantly, 524 to be aware of an affordance is not to have some kind of belief about the world (e.g., 525
beliefs about cause and effect; Reed, 1996) . Informed awareness is not just information 526 about the environment, but of information about oneself in relation to that surrounding 527 environment as well (Shaw & Kinsella-Shaw, 2007) . One consequence of the performer-environment system assumption is that 548 behaviour can be understood as self-organized under constraints, in contrast to 549 organization being imposed from inside (e.g., the mind) or outside (e.g., reinforcement 550 contingencies, or the instructions of a coach). Performance is not prescribed by internal 551 or external structures, yet within existing constraints, there are typically a limited 552 number of stable solutions that can achieve specific desired outcomes (Araújo et al,  553   2006 ). An athlete's task is to exploit physical (e.g., rule-determined performance area 554 characteristics) and informational (e.g., characteristics like surface features to be used 555 in vertical ascent or distances to angles between co-positioning other players) 556 constraints to stabilize performance behaviours. Constraints have the effect of reducing 557 the number of configurations available to an athlete at any instance. In a performance 558 environment, behaviour patterns emerge under constraints as less functional states of 559 organization are dissipated. Athletes can exploit this tendency to enhance their 560 adaptability and even to maintain performance stability under perturbations from the 561 environment. Importantly, changes in performance constraints can lead a system 562 towards bifurcation points where choices emerge as more specific information becomes 563 available, constraining the environment-athlete system to switch to more functional 564 paths of behaviour (such as performing a half volley on court in tennis, rather than a 565 volley, as ball trajectory changes due to top spin on the ball). Measurement of the 566 dynamics of eco-biophysical variables (e.g., the angle between an attacker-defender-567 goal) enables understanding of how the cognitive functioning might be predicated on 568 emergent, on-going performer-environment interactions in sport (Araújo et al., 2006; 569 Correia et al, 2013) . 570
571
Choice of action modes while perceiving an affordance 572 24 When a performer changes from one action mode (walking towards a ball) to 573 another (running after catching it), transitions among stable behavioural states (i.e., 574 action modes) emerge from dynamic instabilities in the athlete-environment system. 575
Transitioning provides a universal decision-making process for switching between 576 distinct behavioural patterns (Kelso, 1995) . Such stabilities and instabilities do not exist 577 a priori in the (internalised) memorial structure of a performer, nor are pre-determined 578 in the structure of the environment. Rather they are co-determined by the confluence of 579 constraints and information, exemplifying how control lies in the emerging relations of 580 the individual-environment system. This is a key point for sport psychologists to 581 understand when they engage with athletes to help improve their decision-making 582 behaviours. Emergent behavioural patterns have been formally modelled using 583 Behaviours can be sustained by simultaneous and successive affordances, and 663 not necessarily by a hierarchical plan or representation capturing a sequence of 664 performance operations (Araújo, Dicks, Davids, in press). Reed (1993) argued that these 665 patterns of behavioral organization emerge in situations in which different affordances 666 can be utilized to enhance performance in contexts like sport. This performer-667 environment basis of conceptualizing behaviour indicates that affordances can be used, 668 motivating an organism to act, but they are not to be viewed as unique causes for 669 behaviour because a person may not act on a perceived affordance. Affordances favour 670 certain behaviours and select against others (Withagen et al., 2012) . The factors 671 underlying the tendency for favoured behaviours to be realized are multiple. For 672 28 example, in climbing, a rock surface may be traversable for an individual climber in a 673 specific way, depending on the availability and spatial organization of surface texture 674 properties (holes shape, size and orientation, offering more or less stability) (Seifert et 675 al 2015) . Indeed, each surface property has many affordances, and it is from this 676 selection of which affordance to act upon that it is possible to understand behavioural 677 dynamics in different climbers. Whether the individual takes up these possibilities or 678 not is a separate matter since affordances are not deterministic causes, i.e., one can 679 decline or accept an invitation to act in a specific way (Withagen et al. 2012 (Withagen et al. , 2017 . 680
Since affordances do not select themselves, the intention to use an affordance, as Reed 681 (1993) put it, like other biological phenomena, emerges out of a process of variation and 682 selection. In this way, people are 'drawn into' interactions with affordances offered by a 683 performance environment (Withagen et al., 2017) . 684
Relatedly, Kiverstein and Rietveld (2015) defined skilled intentionality as "the 685 individual's selective openness and responsiveness to a rich landscape of affordances" 686 (p.701). This notion indicates that the everyday environment offers a range of more or 687 less inviting affordances (Withagen et al. 2012 ). However, these affordances are 688 relational: accessible to individuals with necessary skills (e.g., developed through 689 previous experiences) to act on them. For example, where one tennis player with an 690 excellent backhand shot may perceive an opportunity to force cross-court shots when 691 using it, another player who is highly-skilled at volleying may perceive every ball as an 692 opportunity to approach the net. Thus, sports people interact with a surrounding 693 environment through skilled engagement with the concrete affordances that a specific 694 environment offers them. because of their unique skill set. From this viewpoint 695 perceptual attunement developed through experience brings an 'openness' to 696
